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THE DECLARATION OF WAR: ONE FOR THE HISTORY BOOKS?
The concept of the declaration of war has been a part of the Amencan system of government since the Constitution was ratified in 1789. Its
Iustificatlon revolves around the requirement to manifest, via the legislative process, the backing of the American people regarding the involvement of U.S.
combat forces. With such reasonable Justification, one would expect to see the Congress approve a declaration of war rn every application of U.S. militatv force.
However, its history presents an inverse reality. Since 1798, the United States has tnvolved its military forces in over 200 conflicts.(l5:26) Upon closer examination of these specific conflicts, it is important to note that a formal declaration of war was issued on only five occasions.
In 1973, a malor step was taken to finally prescribe how this nation would send its troops to war. The passage of the War Powers Resolution (WPR) was seen bv many as an attempt to rein-in the authority of the Commander-in-Chief to commit U.S. military forces. In reality, the WPR solidified the often tenuous relationship between the executive and legislative branches regarding the accepted method of introducing American troops into a crisis. Our latest success in the Persian Gulf, initiated solely within the guidelines of the WPR, raises further questions about the role of the formal declaration of war in future conflicts characterized as being rapid, limited and relatively bloodless affairs (hopefully). Accordingly, the declaration of war, while originally thought of as In a close vote, the Congress formally declared war against Britain on 18 June . .After reiterated menaces, Mexico has passed the boundary of the United States, has invaded our territory and shed American blood upon American ml.
She has proclaimed that hostilities have commenced, and that the two nations are now at war .bv act of the Republic of Mexico, a state of war exists between that Government and the United States. The second common factor in these declared wars is the fact that the President In power at the time the declaration of war was approved saw such a declaration as the last step in a long chain of events. Specifically, the President was reluctant to proceed with a formal declaration of war against an aggressor nation until a specific incident or incidents pushed him to ask Congress for the formal declaration of war. These incidents included the impressment of The truly Infrequent use of the declaration of war contradicts the idea that it is appropriate for every use of American force. The great maJon@ of mMarv involvement was neither popular enough to win strong support of the public and Congress nor involved a strong enough incident to lead to a declared war, as the ultimate manifestation of American anger and desire for retribution.
Given the lessons from our increasrngly unpopular involvement in Vietnam, it is 9 reasonable to expect Congress to subject any notion of a declared war to lengthy debate and to not side with the historic record of blind support for presidential leadership. As stated by Edwards and Wayne, "The types of presidential initiatives that the War Powers Resolution seems designed to prevent, the longterm conventional limited wars similar to Korea and Vietnam, seems to be those that are least likely to occur rf the political climate that has existed in the United
States since the mid-1970's persrsts." (3:456) Indeed, the declaration of war seems reserved for a type of conflict that may be passing from the scene -the long, protracted, unlimited and global war that modern theorists feel is the opposite of the type of conflicts Indicative of modern warfare.
A strong message was sent by our conflict In Iraq about the future of the declaration of war. This conflict, executed under the mantle of the WPR, may have been the final nail In the coffin for a concept terminally ill from under use and, poorly surted to deal with the current trend in modern warfare. Bed on history, current leglslatlon and the future of warfare, the declaration of war may indeed be a concept relegated to the history books. 10 
